Notice: PERSONS attempting to discern the relevance of this narrative will be prosecuted; persons attempting to find a moral in it will be banished; persons attempting to find a plot in it will be shot.

For the skimmers: IBM created a machine that was designed not to be technologically superior, but to be strategically disruptive. In my view, the IBM PC was "scientifically designed" to kneecap Apple. The conventional wisdom is that IBM foolishly didn't capitalize on an ecosystem they created, letting Wintel dominate. But that misses the point. If IBM’s primary goal was to prevent Apple from becoming a major player in the business-computing market, they succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.

My journey into software engineering, like that of many of my generation, was inextricably linked to the rise of the personal computer. The narrative often focuses on the PC vs. Mac rivalry, but that misses a more nuanced and, frankly, more brutal story. It's a story about the strategic deployment of technology, the commoditization of innovation, and the surprising resilience of a certain fruit-branded company.

My own introduction to computing came not through the Apple II, but through my school’s BBC Micro, a British microcomputer with an elegant design and those iconic red function keys. It was based on the 6502 chip, the same processor that powered the Apple II.

The Apple II, launched in 1977, four years before the BBC Micro, was indeed a groundbreaking machine. It was one of the first truly successful personal computers, finding its way into home, schools, and crucially, into businesses. Its success in businesses was driven by the availability of software like VisiCalc, the first electronic spreadsheet. This "killer app" transformed the Apple II from a hobbyist's toy into a serious business tool.

Apple was a billion-dollar business by the early 1980s, a staggering achievement at the time. But even as the Apple II was raking in the money, forces were gathering that would soon alter the landscape of personal computing forever.

Enter IBM. The corporate giant, a behemoth in the technology world, ignored the personal computer at first. But when they acted, they acted decisively and ruthlesslessly to vacate the possibility of Apple ever threatening IBM’s core business-computing market. Their response was not a technological leap forward, but a strategic masterstroke. The IBM PC, released in 1981, was not a revolution in terms of raw computing power. It was, however, a revolution in terms of market strategy.

Note that IBM didn't move any of its high-end mainframe technology to the PC. Instead, they assembled a small, new team. They used off-the-shelf components from various manufacturers, which kept costs down and sped up development, and simply "invented afresh" anything else needed to fill technology gaps at the low end. And, most crucially, they adopted an open architecture. This was a radical departure from IBM's traditional closed approach.

We should not take lightly the fact that a storied company with essentially infinite technical depth and execution skills adopted such an unconventional-for-them approach.

It was a classic case of "commoditize your opponent." By making the PC an open standard, IBM made it easy for other companies to produce compatible machines, driving down prices and making the Apple II, with its proprietary hardware and higher prices, seem less competitive.

This wasn't a case of IBM simply "catching up" with Apple. It was a calculated move to protect their core business, the business of large-scale computing. IBM didn't want to risk the entry of a new competitor into their core business market, especially one with as much cachet as Apple. If you listen to Steve Jobs’s talks from that era, it’s crystal clear he was squarely focused on the business market.

So, IBM created a machine that was designed, not to be technologically superior, but to be strategically disruptive. In my view, the IBM PC was "scientifically designed" to kneecap Apple. It was a move that undermined Apple's business position by creating a competitive market that Apple would struggle to compete in.

The conventional wisdom is that IBM foolishly didn't capitalize on the ecosystem they created, letting Wintel dominate. But that misses the point. If IBM’s primary goal was to prevent Apple from becoming a major player in the business market, they succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. In my view, Apple still hasn't fully recovered from that shellacking, even after all these years.

The rise of the PC clones was a double-edged sword for IBM. On the one hand, it helped to establish the PC as the industry standard, creating a massive market for PC software and peripherals. On the other hand, it also meant that IBM gradually lost control of the market they had created.

As more and more companies began producing cheaper and more powerful PC clones, IBM's market share began to erode. They tried various strategies to combat the clones, including introducing new PC models with proprietary architectures, like the PS/2, and trying to enforce their patents more aggressively. However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. The PC market became increasingly commoditized, and IBM eventually exited the PC hardware business. My fondness for Thinkpads will be covered another time!

Apple, meanwhile, struggled to respond effectively to the rise of the PC. Apple, under the leadership of Steve Jobs, neglected the Apple II line, going all-in on new, more advanced (and ultimately unsuccessful) platforms. This was a critical misstep, as they failed to defend their existing core business. Their attempts to leapfrog the PC with the Lisa and the Macintosh were both technologically ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful. The Lisa, released in 1983, was technically advanced but prohibitively expensive. The Macintosh, released in 1984, was revolutionary in its interface, but it was initially underpowered, expensive, and lacked software.

It was only much later, with the return of Steve Jobs and the introduction of the iPhone, that Apple finally found a way to regain its footing. Jobs, a generational talent with a keen eye for technological arbitrage, recognized that existing technologies, like mobile processors, touchscreens, and the internet, could be combined in a new and innovative way. This led to the creation of the iPhone. Later, MacBooks with Retina screens and excellent touchpads, along with the rise of the open web ecosystem, finally brought Apple back to the business market, albeit primarily at the high end. Apple spent decades in the wilderness between these two eras.

The story of the IBM PC and the Apple II is more than just a tale of two computers. It's a story about strategy, competition, and the ever-changing landscape of technology. It's a story about how a corporate giant, through a combination of strategic planning and calculated risk-taking, was able to effectively commoditize a potential threat and reshape an entire industry. It's a story that, I believe, offers valuable lessons for anyone seeking to understand the dynamics of technological innovation. And it's a story that, for me, began not with the hype of the Apple II, but with the quiet elegance of the BBC Micro.